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RECENT DECISIONS
Act.8 Their scope of inquiry is as broad as any dispute arising out
of or in connection with the contract (except where restricted in the
submission), 9 and their basis is an irrevocable contract 10 which can-
not be altered by the act of one party in refusing to arbitrate.1 Thus
the arbitrators have a wide scope of inquiry without regard to the
formalities of counterclaims and their independence as actions. In
the instant case the court rises above the controversy surrounding
the application of the doctrine of res judicata since the Schuylkill
decision,'2 and solves the problem confronting it by simple syllogistic
reasoning. Arbitration presupposes dispute, premises the court.
The dispute submitted was whether the vendee had a valid objection
to paying the otherwise absolute debt which arose on delivery of the
goods contracted for. Therefore, in awarding the full amount to the
vendor, the merits of the defense were absolutely determined. The
other party's non-appearance in the prior proceeding had no bearing
on the decision, for jurisdiction and consent to the proceeding had
been given beforehand in the original contract.13
The inviolability of contracts is the strength of the arbitration
method. By applying normal contract rules to the arbitration clause,
the courts have succeeded in reducing their already overburdened
calendars. They are loath to vitiate this advantage by allowing fur-
ther litigation on a valid award. This decision is in line with that
manifest trend.
I. F. B.
BAILMENT-LIABILITY OF PARKING LOT OPERATOR.-Plaintiff
parked his automobile on defendant's parking lot and paid a fee to
an employee, who after requesting plaintiff to leave the ignition key
in the lock, inquired when the automobile would be claimed. Plain-
tiff was uncertain when he would return. The attendant suggested
that he would put the ignition key beneath the floormat of the car
in the event that the plaintiff returned after eleven P.M. at which
time the lot closed. To this the plaintiff agreed. About two hours
8 N. Y. Civ. Pmac. Acr §§ 1462, 1462-a.
9 Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 43 N. E. 2d 817 (1942);
Fidler v. Cooper, 19 Wend. 285 (N. Y. 1838); Wheeler v. Van Houton, 12
Johns. 311 (N. Y. 1815); Matter of Pierce v. Brown Buick Co., 258 App.
Div. 679, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 283 N. Y. 669, 28 N. E.
2d 400 (1940) ; Samuel Kaplan & Sons v. Fascinator Blouse Co., - Misc.
70 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
' N. Y. Crv. PpAc. AcT § 1448.
"Matter of Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923)
(of course either party can bring action in the courts in the first instance and
thus supersede the right to arbitrate).
12 Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., supra note 2.
'13 N. Y. Crv. PRA.c. ACT § 1450.
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after closing time the vehicle was driven away by a third person and
damaged. An action of trespass on the case was instituted for the
alleged negligence of the defendants as bailees of the automobile.
Held, judgment for defendants. Although the relationship was one
of bailment, the bailment terminated at the time the lot closed, put-
ting the vehicle back in the constructive possession of the plaintiff.
Tammelleo v. Solomon, - R. I. -, 66 A. 2d 101 (1949).
The first issue to be determined was whether or not the trans-
action amounted to a bailment. Whether the relationship between a
parking lot proprietor and a patron is that of bailment depends upon
the place, conditions and nature of the transaction.' The circum-
stances surrounding the parking of a car upon a lot can give rise to
either a bailment, license, or lease.2 If possession and control of the
automobile have been delivered to the proprietor of the parking lot,
and a payment has been made, there is a bailment for hire.3  The
courts are in accord as to what is sufficient to constitute a transfer
of possession giving rise to a bailment. Bailments have been found
to exist in those instances where there is issued a stub to be sur-
rendered on claiming the car, a fee is collected and the keys are left
in the car for the convenience of the management to facilitate the
entrance and exit of other cars by shifting about the ones on the lot.4
Courts have declined to find a bailment in those cases where the car
owner does not relinquish control, as where he parks the car himself,
retains the key and removes it without surrendering a check. 5 The
instant case, in finding a bailment, is supported by, and adds to, the
weight of authority.
The instructions given the jury in the instant case-that defen-
dants would have been liable if plaintiff had no notice of the time of
closing and if he did not agree that the key be left under the mat of
the car-are in accord with the authority as established by two other
leading cases on point, Starita v. Campbell 6 and Automobile Ins. Co.
of Hartford v. Syndicate Parking Co.7 In the latter case, under
I Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A. 2d 51 (1949) ; Osborn v. Cline,
263 N. Y. 434, 189 N. E. 483 (1934).
2 See Note, 131 A. L. R. 1175 (1941); Jones, The Parking Lot Cases,
27 GEo. L. L. 162 (1938).
3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1065A (revd. ed. 1936) ; Beetson v. Hollywood
Athletic Club, 109 Cal. App. 715, 293 Pac. 821 (1930) ; Doherty v. Ernst, 284
Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933) ; Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203
N. Y.-Supp. 421 (1924); Wendt v. Sley System Garages, 124 Pa. Super. 224,
188 Atl. 624 (1936).
4 Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co., 307 Mass. 470, 30 N. E. 2d 389(1940); General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Service Parking Grounds, 254 Mich. 1,
235 N. W. 898 (1931); Baione v. Heavy, 103 Pa. Super. 529, 158 Atl. 181
(1932).
5 Ex parte Mobile Light & R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So.. 177 (1924) ; Osborn
v. Cline, 263 N. Y. 434, 189 N. E. 483 (1934).
672 R. I. 405, 52 A. 2d 303 (1947).
7 58 Ohio App. 148, 16 N. E. 2d 239 (1937).
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similar circumstances, it was decided that defendant's attendant did
not exercise the proper degree of care when he quitted the lot at
midnight leaving the key in the unguarded automobile without hav-
ing previously informed the motorist of the hour of closing. Relying
on Continental Ins. Co. v. Himbert s the court also instructed the jury
that the converse of the above rule would be true, i.e., that if the
plaintiff knew the time of closing and agreed that the key be placed
under the mat, then defendants would not be liable, for the duration
of the bailment contract was limited to closing time, and by leaving
the key in the car after closing as' stipulated, there was a constructive
delivery of the car.
That New York is aligned with the weight of authority and the
case under discussion in finding a bailment under such circumstances,
there is no doubt.9 Whether New York would ascribe to a bailee the
duty of giving notice to a bailor that his car-the keys inside-will
be unprotected after a certain time, is not known. There are no New
York cases on the point. It seems elementary that this obligation is
reasonable and not so burdensome as to be outside the scope of a
bailee's duty of due care.
A. C. M.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAw--ExcLu-
SION OF NEGROES FROM JuRIEs.-The prisoner, a Negro, was con-
victed of the capital crime of rape upon a verdict returned by a jury
composed entirely of white men.1 At the trial the judge unexpect-
edly caused a special venire of petit jurors to be summoned from
Warren County, 82 miles away.2 Counsel for prisoner presented a
challenge to the entire array of petit jurors on the ground of sys-
tematic exclusion of Negroes from petit juries of Warren County
contrary to the United States Constitution and the laws of North
Carolina. Counsel then moved for time to allow the defense to get
evidence to sustain the challenge. This motion was denied by the
trial judge thus forcing defendant's counsel to undertake to support
the challenge by calling six witnesses at random from among by-
standers in the court room. The judge thereupon overruled the
8 37 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 1948).
9 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1924);
Potomac Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 274 App. Div. 666, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 145 (1949).
1 This was the second trial and appeal of the prisoner. His former con-
viction had been set aside because of denial of the constitutional right of equal
protection of law through the purposeful exclusion of the members of his race
from the grand jury by which he was indicted. State v. Speller, 229 N. C.
67, 47 S. E. 2d 537 (1948).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-86 provides that the judge may summon
jurors from any other county in the same judicial district, if he has probable
grounds to believe that a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be obtained.
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